![]() ![]() With the identification of alternative value creation technologies, value chain analysis is both sharpened and generalized into what we propose as a value configuration analysis approach to the diagnosis of competitive advantage. While the long-linked technology delivers value by transforming inputs into products, the intensive technology delivers value by resolving unique customer problems, and the mediating technology delivers value by enabling direct and indirect exchanges between customers. The implications and limitations are also discussed.īuilding on Thompson's (1967) typology of long-linked, intensive, and mediating technologies, this paper explores the idea that the value chain, the value shop, and the value network are three distinct generic value configuration models required to understand and analyze firm-level value creation logic across a broad range of industries and firms. The managerial implication of the study includes that with better relationship strength, it is possible to neutralize the negative impact of distance on export performance. A strong positive relationship between relationship quality and export performance is also identified. The results show that distance is negatively related to communication climate and relationship quality relationship quality mediates the distance–export performance relationship, whereas communication climate is positively associated with relationship quality and export performance, and a full mediating role of relationship quality is found in the communication climate–export performance relationship. A mediation model was tested using structural equation modeling, applying partial least squares techniques. The ready-made garments industry in Bangladesh yielded 185 responses. ![]() The authors explore how distance and the communication climate perceived by exporters influence export performance both directly and as mediated by relationship quality. This also suggests that Taiwanese component suppliers are unable to create entry barriers or gain pricing power from their R&D investments. These findings suggest that component suppliers capture higher profits as lead firms do, but the cost of R&D for component suppliers is so high that their returns on investment are not as great as contract manufacturers. Component suppliers’ return to R&D as measured by return on equity is lower than contract manufacturers. However, contract manufacturers have higher return on equity. Our results show that lead firms and component suppliers capture higher gross profits from their R&D spending, compared to contract manufacturers. We also test the impacts of research and development (R&D) spending on firm profitability and returns. Using data from the Taiwanese Stock Exchange from 2002 to 2009, this research aims to examine if the pattern of value capture in the global electronics industry holds for Taiwan. In today's global electronics industry, lead firms and suppliers of key components capture greater value than contract manufacturers. A number of model variants and extensions are also considered: changing demand, exogenous instability factors, market distortions, externalities and outside options. Therefore, expected costs and benefits, at the aggregate as well as at the individual level, can be compared to assess the economic viability of any investment in network infrastructure. Any change in the network structure entails both a variation in the overall welfare level and in the distribution of surplus among agents, as it affects their relative bargaining power. The method we propose, which is illustrated here through an application to a fictitious network structure, is based on a two-stage process: first, a network optimization model is used to generate payoff values under different coalitions and network structures second, cooperative game solutions are identified. The overall economic surplus obtained in the market is distributed among all network agents the on the basis of their bargaining power, which in turn depends on a variety of factors: position of each agent (e.g., a country) in the network, reliability in the cooperation scheme (e.g., geo-political stability), existence of market distortions and availability of outside options (e.g., alternative energy sources). This paper introduces a novel methodology for analyzing bargaining games on network markets, which are markets where transactions occur by means of distribution networks (e.g., gas, electric energy, water, etc.). ![]()
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